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Hart Senate Office Building
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of
NICHOLAS QUINN ROSENKRANZ
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF LAW
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sessions, Members of the Committee: I thank
you for the opportunity to testify at this momentous Hearing. I have been asked to
comment on the use of contemporary foreign and international legal materials in the
interpretation of the United States Constitution. In a recent speech, Judge Sotomayor
seemed to embrace and defend this approach.1 I believe that, in this, she may be
misguided. I have written about this issue in the Stanford Law Review2 and the Harvard
Journal of Law & Public Policy,3 and I will be drawing substantially on those articles in
my remarks today. I also had the honor of testifying on this issue before the House
Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, and I commend the record of that Hearing to
the Committee as well.4
1

See Sonia Sotomayor, Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, How Federal Judges
Look to International and Foreign Law Under Article VI of the U.S. Constitution, Speech Before the
American Civil Liberties Union of Puerto Rico (Apr. 28, 2009), available at New York Times, Speech to
the A.C.L.U. of Puerto Rico,
http://video.nytimes.com/video/2009/06/10/us/politics/1194840839480/speech-to-the-a-c-l-u-of-puertorico.html (last visited Jul. 8, 2009) [hereinafter Sotomayor Speech]. Oddly, Judge Sotomayor seemed to
say exactly the opposite in testimony on Tuesday. See M. Edward Whelan III, Sotomayor's Confusion on
Use of Foreign Law, BENCH MEMOS ON NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, Jul. 14, 2009,
http://bench.nationalreview.com/post/?q=NmU3NzQ3N2UzMjM2NGFjNDkzYWU5MGY1YzYxODBhN
WY=WHELAN. I shall address my testimony to the position set forth in her April 28 speech and leave it
to the Committee to reconcile her more recent statements.
2
See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Condorcet and the Constitution: A Response to The Law of Other
States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1281 (2007).
3
See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, An American Amendment, 32 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 475, 475-79
(2009).
4
See House Resolution on the Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments in the Interpretation of the
Constitution of the United States: Hearing on H.R. 97 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 30 (2005) (statement of Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Associate
Professor, Georgetown University Law Center).
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This issue has come to recent prominence because in two of the most high-profile
and hot-button cases of the past decade, the Supreme Court relied on contemporary
foreign law to help determine the meaning of the United States Constitution.5 These sorts
of foreign citations are quite controversial, and four current Supreme Court Justices have
expressly objected to them. Justice Scalia6 and Justice Thomas7 have repeatedly
explained why it is inappropriate to rely on foreign law when interpreting the U.S.
Constitution. And, in hearings before this Committee, the two most recently confirmed
Justices, Justice Alito8 and Chief Justice Roberts,9 also expressly repudiated such

5

See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S 551, 575-78 (2005); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 568-74 (2003).
See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370 n.1 (1989); Stephen Breyer & Antonin Scalia, Assoc.
Justices, U.S. Supreme Court, Debate at American University: Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court
Decisions (Jan. 13, 2005) (Jan. 13, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/fnews/1352357/posts).
7
See, e.g., Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n.* (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari)
(“While Congress, as a legislature, may wish to consider the actions of other nations on any issue it likes,
this Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on
Americans.”).
8
See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito to be an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 471 (2006).
I don't think that we should look to foreign law to interpret our own Constitution …. I think the
framers would be stunned by the idea that the Bill of Rights is to be interpreted by taking a poll of
the countries of the world …. The purpose of the Bill of Rights was to give Americans rights that
were recognized practically nowhere else in the world at the time. The framers did not want
Americans to have the rights of people in France or the rights of people in Russia or any of the
other countries on the continent of Europe at the time …. They wanted them to have the rights of
Americans. And I think we should interpret our Constitution—we should interpret our
Constitution. And I don't think it's appropriate to look to foreign law. I think that it presents a host
of practical problems that have been pointed out. You have to decide which countries you are
going to survey. And then it's often difficult to understand exactly what you are to make of foreign
court decisions. All countries don't set up their court systems the same way. Foreign courts may
have greater authority than the courts of the United States. They may be given a policy-making
role. And, therefore, it would be more appropriate for them to weigh in on policy issues. When
our Constitution was being debated, there was a serious proposal to have members of the judiciary
sit on a council of revision, where they would have a policy-making role before legislation was
passed. And other countries can set up their judiciary in that way. So you'd have to understand the
jurisdiction and the authority of the foreign courts. And then sometimes it's misleading to look to
just one narrow provision of foreign law without considering the larger body of law in which it's
located. If you focus too narrowly on that, you may distort the big picture. So for all those
reasons, I just don't think that's a useful thing to do.
Id.
9
See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts to be Chief Justice of the United States
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 201 (2005).
If we're relying on a decision from a German judge about what our Constitution means, no
president accountable to the people appointed that judge and no Senate accountable to the people
confirmed that judge. And yet he's playing a role in shaping the law that binds the people in this
country …. The other part of it that would concern me is that, relying on foreign precedent doesn't
confine judges …. Foreign law, you can find anything you want. If you don't find it in the
decisions of France or Italy, it’s in the decisions of Somalia or Japan or Indonesia or wherever. As
somebody said in another context, looking at foreign law for support is like looking out over a
crowd and picking out your friends. You can find them. They’re there. And that actually expands
the discretion of the judge. It allows the judge to incorporate his or her own personal preferences,
cloak them with the authority of precedent—because they're finding precedent in foreign law—
6
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citations. Indeed, Congress itself reacted quite strongly to these citations, holding several
hearings on this topic10—and even going so far as to consider legislation disapproving
such reliance on foreign law.11 Dozens of Representatives and several Senators have
endorsed such legislation.
Judge Sotomayor, however, has said that the position of these Justices is based on
a “misunderstanding.”12 And likewise, according to Judge Sotomayor, those like the
many Senators and Congressmen who would forbid this sort of reliance also labor under
a “fundamental misunderstanding.”13 Most tellingly, in the same speech, Judge
Sotomayor cited with approval the two most controversial instances in which the
Supreme Court used foreign law to interpret the U.S. Constitution.14
I believe that contemporary foreign law generally has no place in the
interpretation of the United States Constitution. Rather than reiterate the trenchant,
pragmatic arguments of Professor McGinnis, I will explain why reliance on foreign law
and use that to determine the meaning of the Constitution. And I think that's a misuse of
precedent, not a correct use of precedent.
Id.
10
See, e.g., House Resolution on the Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments in the Interpretation of the
Constitution of the United States: Hearing on H.R. Res 97 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005); Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments in the
Interpretation of American Law: Hearing on H.R. Res. 568 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004).
11
See H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (2005); Constitution Restoration Act of 2004, S. 2323, 108th Cong.; H.R.
Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2004); Constitution Restoration Act of 2004, S. 2082, 108th Cong.; Constitution
Restoration Act of 2004, H.R. 3799, 108th Cong.
12
See Sotomayor Speech, supra note 1 (“But this use [of foreign law] does have a great deal of criticism.
The nature of the criticism comes from, as I explained, the misunderstanding of the American use of that
concept of using foreign law. And that misunderstanding is unfortunately endorsed by some of our
Supreme Court justices. Both Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas have written extensively criticizing the use
of foreign and international law to [sic] in Supreme Court decisions.”).
13
See id. (“To suggest to anyone that you can outlaw the use of foreign or international law is a sentiment
that’s based on a fundamental misunderstanding.”).
14
See id.
We have looked, in some Supreme Court decisions, to foreign law to help us decide our issues.
So, for example, in Roper v. Simmons, Justice Kennedy noted that for almost a half century the
Supreme Court has referenced the law of other countries into international authorities as
instructive for its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment. And in that case, the Supreme Court outlawed the death penalty of juveniles in the
United States. Similarly, in a recent case, Lawrence v. Tribe, [sic] the Supreme Court overturned a
Texas state law making it a crime for two people of the same sex to engage in certain intimate
sexual acts. And the Justice referred to the repeal of such laws … in many countries of the world.
In both those cases, the courts were very, very careful to note that they weren’t using that law to
decide the American question. They were just using that law to help us understand what the
concepts meant to other countries, and to help us understand whether our understanding of our
own constitutional rights fell into the mainstream of human thinking. There may well be times
where we disagree with the mainstream of international law. But there is much ambiguity in law,
and I for one believe that if you look at the ideas of everyone and consider them and test them, test
the force of their persuasiveness, look at them carefully, examine where they’re coming from and
why, that your own decision will be better informed.
Id.

3

to interpret the U.S. Constitution is in tension with our constitutional text and structure,
and with fundamental notions of democratic self-governance. I should emphasize that I
take no position on the ultimate question of whether Judge Sotomayor should be
confirmed, and I offer my comments with the greatest respect. But I am concerned that
her recent speech on this issue may betray a misconception of the judicial role. For the
balance of my testimony, I shall explain why.
In this room, and at the Supreme Court, and in law schools, and throughout the
nation, we speak of our Constitution in almost metaphysical terms. In the United States,
we revere our Constitution. And well we should; it is the single greatest charter of
government in history. But it is worth remembering exactly what the Constitution is.
The Constitution is a text. It is comprised of words on parchment. A copy fits
comfortably in an inside pocket, but copies don’t quite do it justice. The original is just
down the street at the National Archives, and it is something to see. It is sealed in a
titanium case filled with argon gas, and at night it is kept in an underground vault.15 But
during the day, anyone can go see it, and read it. The parchment is in shockingly good
condition. And the words are still clearly visible.
The most important job of a Supreme Court justice is to discern what the words
on that parchment mean. The Constitution includes words that some people wish it did
not, like “the right of the people to keep and bear arms.”16 And it omits words that some
people wish it included, like “privacy.” But this is not the proper concern of a Justice.
The job of the Court is not to instill the text with meaning. It is not to declare what the
text should mean. It is not to excise some words. It is not to add others. It is to discern,
using standard tools of legal interpretation, the meaning of the words on that piece of
parchment.
Now language evolves, of course, but that evolution does not alter the interpretive
project. A word in the Constitution may have taken on a new meaning in the centuries
since the Constitution was ratified, but evolution in language does not effect amendment
of law. This is why when the Court looks to dictionaries to interpret the Constitution, it
looks not to contemporary dictionaries but to dictionaries from the Founding era.17 And
this is why, for example, no one contends that the constitutional phrase “domestic
Violence”18 should be understood in its modern sense, when that sense was entirely

15

See NICHOLAS A. BASBANES, A SPLENDOR OF LETTERS: THE PERMANENCE OF BOOKS IN AN
IMPERMANENT WORLD 6 (2003).
16
U.S. CONST. amend. II.
17
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 2828 (2008) (citing S. Johnson, Dictionary of the
English Language (4th ed. 1773)); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585-87 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (citing S. Johnson, Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed. 1773); N. Bailey, An Universal
Etymological English Dictionary (26th ed. 1789); T. Sheridan, A Complete Dictionary of the English
Language (6th ed. 1796)); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 719 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing S.
Johnson, Dictionary of the English Language (6th ed. 1785)). See also Randy E. Barnett, The Original
Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101, 113-14 (2001).
18
U.S. CONST. art. IV § 4.
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unknown at the Framing.19 The project of constitutional law is to discern what the text of
the U.S. Constitution—those words on that parchment down the street—meant to the
American people at the time of ratification.20
In many cases, the text is clear. For many questions, you don’t need a lawyer, let
alone a constitutional scholar. All you need to do is walk down the street and read the
words. But sometimes the meaning of those words is not perfectly clear. Merely reading
the parchment may not suffice. One might need to turn to other sources to help
understand the meaning of the words. One might, for example, turn to a dictionary from
the founding era. One might turn to the Federalist Papers, or to early Supreme Court
cases, to see what early and authoritative interpreters thought that those words meant.
One might even turn to British legal sources, like the Magna Carta, or Blackstone, or
Coke, because those sources were perhaps in the minds of the ratifiers at the time.
But what the Supreme Court has done in two controversial cases is to rely on
contemporary foreign law in determining the meaning of the United States Constitution.
This is the practice that Judge Sotomayor seemed to endorse in her recent speech.21 And
it is this practice that is of great concern, because the relevance of these sources is
questionable at best. When one is trying to figure out the meaning of the document down
the street at the Archives, it is mysterious why one would need to study other legal
documents, written in other languages, for other purposes, in other political
circumstances, hundreds of years later and thousands of miles away. To put the point
most simply, as a general matter, it is simply unfathomable how the law of, say, France in
2009 could help one discern the public meaning of the United States Constitution in
1789.
So far, all this must seem like common sense. But it may come as a surprise to
the American people to learn that not everyone accepts these premises. Some judges, and
many law professors, do not believe that the Court should try to discern the original
public meaning of the words on the parchment down the street. They seem to believe,
19

See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1-14, at 52-53 (3d ed. 2000); Michael
Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for its Own Interpretation? 877 (U of St. Thomas
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-36, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1301706.
20
See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 621 (1999) (“In
constitutional interpretation, the shift is from the original intentions or will of the lawmakers, to the
objective original meaning that a reasonable listener would place on the words used in the constitutional
provision at the time of its enactment.”); Frank H. Easterbook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CHI. L.
REV. 349, 359 (1992) (“Thus the question becomes the level of generality the ratifiers and other
sophisticated political actors at the time would have imputed to the text.”); Michael W. McConnell,
Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1127, 1136 (1998) (“Originalism is the
idea that the words of the Constitution must be understood as they were understood by the ratifying public
at the time of enactment.”) See generally RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY ch. 4 (2004); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The
Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); Lawrence B. Solum,
Semantic Originalism (Ill. Pub. Law and Legal Theory Research Papers, Series No. 07-24, 2008), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120244.
21
See Sotomayor Speech, supra note 1.
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instead, that the Court should infuse those words with meaning.22 They reject the quest
for original meaning and embrace the notion of an “evolving” Constitution. And the
current predilection for using contemporary foreign law to interpret the United States
Constitution necessarily implies an embrace of this “evolving Constitution” theory.
These citations must entail a rejection of the quest for the original meaning of the
Constitution, because, as a matter of logic, they cannot possibly shed light on that
original meaning.
And so, to put the point most starkly, this sort of reliance on contemporary foreign
law must be, in essence, a mechanism of constitutional change. Foreign law changes all
the time, and it has changed continuously since the Founding. If modern foreign law is
relevant to constitutional interpretation, it follows that a change in foreign law can alter
the meaning of the United States Constitution.
And that is why this issue is so important. The notion of the Court “updating” the
Constitution to reflect its own evolving view of good government is troubling enough.
But the notion that this evolution may be brought about by changes in foreign law
violates basic premises of democratic self-governance.23 When American judges
conceive of their job as ensuring, on an ongoing basis, that “our understanding of our
own constitutional rights f[alls] into the mainstream of human thinking,”24 then changes
in that supposed “mainstream” can expand or contract those constitutional rights. When
the Supreme Court declares that the Constitution evolves—and that foreign law may
effect its evolution25—it is declaring nothing less than the power of foreign governments
to change the meaning of the United States Constitution.
And even if the Court purports to seek a foreign “consensus,”26 a single foreign
country might make the difference at the margin.27 Indeed, foreign countries might even
22

See STEVEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 115-32 (2005); RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE
MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 12-15 (1996); RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES
THINK (2008); Address by William J. Brennan, Jr., at Hyde Park, New York, 8 Recorder, Nov. 8, 1989 (“I
frankly concede that I approach my responsibility as a Justice, as a 20th century American not confined to
[the] framers’ vision in 1787. The ultimate question must be, I think, what do the words of the Constitution
and Bill of Rights mean to us in our time.”).
23
See Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreign Sources and the American Constitution, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
223, 228 (2006) (“Foreign law post-dating the Constitution's adoption is relevant only to those who
suppose that judges can change the Constitution or make new political decisions in its name, which I think
just knocks out the basis of judicial review.”).
24
See Sotomayor Speech, supra note 1.
25
If the Court cites foreign sources, presumably it is relying upon them at least in part. The Court has no
business spending government money to print its thoughts in the United States Reports unless those
thoughts are in service of an exercise of the judicial power. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S 551, 628
(2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“‘Acknowledgment’ of foreign approval has no place in the legal opinion of
this Court unless it is part of the basis for the Court's judgment—which is surely what it parades as
today.”).
26
See id. at 577 (majority opinion) (“In sum, it is fair to say that the United States now stands alone in a
world that has turned its face against the juvenile death penalty.”); id. at 604 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the Court's search for an “international consensus”).
27
See, e.g., id. at 577 (“The United Kingdom's experience bears particular relevance here in light of the
historic ties between our countries and in light of the Eighth Amendment's own origins.”). But see id. at
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attempt this deliberately.28 The Court has already held that the Constitution—as
interpreted by reference to foreign law—forbids the execution of murderers, no matter
how heinous their crimes, if they committed their murders before turning eighteen.29 But
some foreign countries would have us go even further; France, for example, has declared
that one of its priorities is the abolition of capital punishment in the United States.30 Yet
surely the American people would rebel at the thought of the French Parliament deciding
whether to abolish the death penalty—not just in France, but also, thereby, in America.31
After all, foreign control over American law was a primary grievance of the
Declaration of Independence. The Declaration, too, may be found at the National
Archives, and its most resonant protest was that King George III had “subject[ed] us to a
jurisdiction foreign to our constitution.”32 This is exactly what is at stake here: foreign
government control over the meaning of our Constitution. Any such control, even at the
margin, is inconsistent with our basic founding principles of democracy and selfgovernance.33
Indeed, the Constitution itself has something to say about constitutional change.
“We the People of the United States . . . ordain[ed] and establish[ed] th[e] Constitution”34
and included mechanisms by which we could change it if necessary. Article V sets forth
a complex, carefully wrought mechanism—really four such mechanisms—for

626-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court has . . . long rejected a purely originalist approach to our Eighth
Amendment, and that is certainly not the approach the Court takes today. Instead, the Court undertakes the
majestic task of determining (and thereby prescribing) our Nation's current standards of decency. It is
beyond comprehension why we should look, for that purpose, to a country that has developed, in the
centuries since the Revolutionary War . . . a legal, political, and social culture quite different from our
own.”).
28
See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Condorcet and the Constitution: A Response to The Law of Other
States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1281, 1305 (2007) (explaining how the United States Supreme Court's reliance on
foreign law could skew the policy incentives of foreign governments in a suboptimal way).
29
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 568.
30
See Ken I. Kersch, Multilateralism Comes to the Courts, PUB. INT., Winter 2004, at 3, 4-5.
31
See Easterbrook, supra note 23, at 228 (“When other nations abolish the death penalty . . . they can do
this by voting and can reverse the result by voting. How, then, can these deliberations and results possibly
eliminate the role of the people of the United States in making decisions?”).
32
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 15 (U.S. 1776). The Declaration also protests:
The history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all
having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States. To prove this, let
Facts be submitted to a candid world.
He has refused his Assent to Laws, the most wholesome and necessary to the public good.
He has forbidden his Governors to pass Laws of immediate and pressing importance, unless
suspended in their operation until his Assent should be obtained; and when so suspended, he has
utterly neglected to attend to them.
Id. para 2-4.
33
See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867, 1911 (2005)
(“Surely the Founders would have been surprised to learn that a United States statute—duly enacted by
Congress and signed by the President—may, under some circumstances, be rendered unconstitutional at the
discretion of, for example, the King of England.”).
34
U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added).
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constitutional change.35 These mechanisms require the concurrence of many different
collective bodies, each with a different—and exclusively American—geographic
perspective.36 There is simply no reason to believe that, in addition to the four express
mechanisms of constitutional change in Article V, there is also a fifth mechanism,
unmentioned in the text, by which foreign governments may change the meaning of the
United States Constitution.
As I mentioned at the outset, in a recent speech, Judge Sotomayor seemed to
endorse reliance on foreign law when interpreting the United States Constitution37
(though her testimony seems to be to the contrary38). Again, I take no position on the
ultimate question of whether Judge Sotomayor should be confirmed. But I do hope that
the Committee will continue to explore her views on this important issue. Judge
Sotomayor has affirmed that the U.S. Constitution has not been changed and cannot be
changed other than by Article V amendment.39 But, as I have explained, if contemporary
foreign law were relevant to the interpretation of the United States Constitution, it would
seem to follow that a change in foreign law could effect a change in the meaning of the
United States Constitution. I hope the Committee will ask Judge Sotomayor whether
foreign governments can, indeed, amend the United States Constitution in this way.

35

The amendment process has two phases, proposal and ratification, and each phase has two options. At
the proposal phase, Congress may propose amendments “whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it
necessary.” U.S. CONST. art. V. Or alternately, “on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the
several States, [Congress] shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments.” Id. Likewise, at the
ratification stage, there are two options: an amendment may be “ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths
of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of
Ratification may be proposed by the Congress.” Id.
36
See id.
37
See Sotomayor Speech, supra note 1.
38
See Whelan, supra note 1.
39
See Sen. Lindsey Graham Holds a Hearing on the Nomination of Judge Sonia Sotomayor to Be an
Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, WASHINGTON POST, July 14, 2009,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/14/AR2009071412782.html.
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